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RECENT DECISIONS
(3) The residence for one year would evidence an intent to become a
permanent resident of the community. These appear to be very weak
arguments to show a compelling state interest.
Residence requirements for divorce actions could also be attacked
using Shapiro logic. The questions are whether the right to adjudicate
marital status is a fundamental right, and whether a compelling state
interest is served which justifies such a requirement.
When state universities charge a higher tuition to non-resident
students, is a fundamental right affected? What if an indigent student
is only accepted by an out-of-state school? If his right to obtain a high-
er education is called a fundamental right, it is burdened by the require-
ment that he pay more. Are there state compelling interests which out-
weigh the burden?
JAMES L. KIRSCHNIK
Criminal Law: Alcoholism as a Defense. In Roberts v. State,"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated its position on chronic alcoholism
as an independent affirmative defense to a murder charge. The defend-
ant, Richard Roberts, had broken into a house and shot to death its in-
habitant. During the 24 hours prior to the killing, Roberts had con-
sumed five large glasses of beer, two to four bottles of beer, a pint of
brandy and another 16 to 29 drinks containing brandy. To the charges
of first degree murder and burglary, Roberts pleaded not guilty, not
guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty by reason of chronic alco-
holism. The trial court found that Roberts was not intoxicated at the
time of the shooting and adjudged him guilty. On appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed and, in dicta, discussed the limited circumstances under
which chronic alcoholism might be interposed as a defense to criminal
liability.
2
On his appeal, the defendant argued that chronic alcoholism is an
affirmative defense to criminal liability. The argument was based largely
on the assumption that chronic alcoholics, like those suffering from in-
sanity, lack the normal capacity to control their conduct. Two cases
decided by different United States courts of appeals and one earlier
Wisconsin case were offered in support of the defendant's argument.
In both federal cases, Driver v. Hinnant3 and Easter v. District of
Columbia,4 convictions of public intoxication were reversed on the
theory that alcoholism is a disease to which no criminal sanctions should
attach. The appellant in Driver had been found guilty of violating a
North Carolina statute which prohibited any intoxicated person from be-
'41 Wis. 2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969).
2 Id. at 543, 164 N.W2d at 527.
3356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
4361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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ing upon a public highway or at any public place or meeting.5 The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the statute was not applic-
able to a chronic alcoholic. The decision rested to a great extent on the
rationale of Robinson v. California6 where the United States Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a California statute which made it a
criminal offense to be addicted to the use of narcotics. The Supreme
Court held that to punish a person for a mere status or condition is
cruel and unusual punishment which violates the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Easter, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ap-
proved the reasoning in Driver, but based its decision on the statutory
definition of "chronic alcoholic" contained in the District of Columbia
Code.7 Both courts of appeals limited their holdings to cases involving
violation of public intoxication statutes. They stated that the defense
of chronic alcoholism was available only in those cases which involve
acts which are "compulsive as symptomatic of that disease."
The Wisconsin case relied upon by the appellant was State v. Frei-
berg,8 a criminal non-support case where alcoholism was raised as a
defense. Under the Wisconsin abandonment statute, the element of
willfulness must be established before criminal liability for non-support
arises. However, the statute makes proof of desertion prima facie evi-
dence of willfulness. The supreme court affirmed Freiberg's conviction
in spite of his claim that he was an alcoholic and that evidence of his
alcoholism should have rebutted the presumption of willfulness. The
supreme court accepted the trial court's finding that Freiberg was not
an alcoholic but indicated in dicta that chronic alcoholism could be
raised as a defense to a criminal non-support charge:
Were proper medical proof submitted showing that because of
the excessive and prolonged use of intoxicating liquor the de-
fendant was an alcoholic and that condition deprived him of the
capacity to work, we could not then permit a court or jury to
rely upon the statutory language making the desertion prima
facie evidence of intent without considering the rebutting evi-
dence.9
5N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1951).
6 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson, a drug addict, was convicted under a California
statute, which made it a criminal offense to be addicted to the use of narcotics.
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held it was cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to imprison a person
thus afflicted, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
state.
7 D.C. CODE § 24-502 (1961 ed.). The act provides, "The term 'chronic alcoholic'
means any person who chronically and habitually uses alcoholic beverages to
the extent that he has lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of
such beverages, or while under the influence of alcohol endangers the public
morals, health, safety, or welfare."
8 35 Wis. 2d 480, 151 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
9 Id. at 484, 151 N.W.2d at 3.
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In Roberts, the court held that neither Driver nor Easter nor Frei-
berg compelled the conclusion that chronic alcoholism should be recog-
nized as an independant affirmative defense to a murder charge. The
reasoning underlying both Driver and Easter applied only to activity
which is compulsive as symptomatic of the disease of alcoholism. Rob-
ert's act of homicide could not be considered symptomatic of alcoholism.
Moreover, both Driver and Easter were rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Powell v. Texas,' 0another public drunkeness case.
The Court stated in Powell that it had "never articulated a general
constitutional doctrine of mens rea.""1 Powell thus rejected the appell-
ant's contention in Roberts that chronic alcoholism as a matter of law
destroys criminal responsibility.
The Wisconsin court also rejected Robert's contention that Freiberg
created a distinct and separate defense of chronic alcoholism.
What was said in Freiberg concerning the inability to work and
thus negating the required mens rea must be limited to such
facts. While sec. 939.42(2), Stats., was not cited, the rationale
expressed in Freiberg that chronic alcoholism might be a defense
was in conformity with sec. 939.42(2), which allows a defense
of intoxication when its presence negates a mens rea, which is a
necessary element of the crime charged.12
Subsection two of Wis. Stats. sec. 939.42 has been invoked in several
instances in order to negate the element of mens rea, but never for the
purpose of a complete defense.' 3 In Lasecki v. State,1 4 the court affirmed
a conviction for second degree murder and stated that:
Under this proof the jury might readily give the defendant the
benefit of the doubt and conclude that he was too much under
the influence of liquor to form the premeditated design to kill
which is the distinguishing element of murder in the first degree. 15
In Smith v. State6 affirming a conviction of first degree murder, the
court found the evidence of the accused's intoxication insufficient to
negate specific intent. The defendant had left a dice game and gone home
to find a gun. He then returned to the game and shot the deceased. Upon
returning home, he told his wife to hide the gun and when the authori-
ties arrived was able to give a detailed account of the events. The court
determined that the accused had the ability to form the requisite intent.
10392 U.S. 514 (1968).
U Id. at 535.
'241 Wis. 2d at 544, 164 N.W.2d at 528.
"3 WIs. STAT. 939.42 (2): "An intoxicated or a drugged condition of the actor
is a defense only if such condition:
(2) Negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime.
14 190 Wis. 274, 208 N.W. 868 (1926).
15 Id. at 279, 208 N.W. at 870.16 248 Wis. 399, 21 N.W.2d 662 (1946).
19701
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In another case, State v. Christiansen," the court affirmed a conviction
of burglarly, holding that while there was evidence which, if believed
by the jury, might warrant the conclusion that the defendant was so
intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent, there was abun-
dant testimony from which the jury could come to a different conclu-
sion.
As early as 1880 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Ingalls v. State,'
recognized that extreme intoxication may have a tendency to disprove
certain elements of a crime, including lack of capacity to perform the
alleged act. The defendant was accused of breaking into a dwelling, but
he was permitted to prove that he was too drunk to perform such a
physical act.
The interesting aspect of Roberts is the attempt by the defendant to
utilize subsection one of Wis. Stats. sec. 939.42, and the court's sugges-
tion that given a specific set of facts a chronic alcoholic addict could
assert his intoxication as a complete defense. Subsection one states that:
An intoxicated or drugged condition of the actor is a defense only
if such condition:
(1) Is involuntarily produced and renders the actor incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to the alleged
criminal act at the time the act is committed;
Examples of the defense of involuntary intoxication are not easy to find.
Professor Jerome Hall, after an extensive study, concluded that "invol-
untary intoxication is simply and completely non-existent."' 19 Although
it is possible to conceive of instances where a person was forced to
drink under threat, or was tricked by fraud, or was given an intoxicat-
ing drug by a physician who misconceived its effect, cases in which the
defense has been successfully raised do not exist. The Model Penal
Code and several state statutes have included a provision for the de-
fense of involuntary intoxication, but there is as yet no case law inter-
preting them. The language of these statutes vary. The Model Penal
Code20 uses the phrase, "intoxication which is not self-induced." The
Arkansas Statute is more specific:
Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misdemeanor,
unless such drunkenness be occasioned by the fraud, contrivance or
force of some other person, for the purpose of causing the perpetra-
tion of an offense .... 21
Louisiana2 ' and Illinois23 both use the term "involuntary" without at-
tempting to define it.
17222 Wis. 132, 267 N.W. 6 (1936).
is Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N.W. 785 (1880).
1o J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRITMINAL LAW, at 539 (2d ed. 1960).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
21 ARK. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-115 (1964).
22 LA. REV. STAT. § 14-15 (1950).
23 ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 38 § 6-3 (1961).
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The dictum in the Roberts decision suggest that the Wisconsin court
may be ready to broaden the definition of "involuntary intoxication"
to include not only intoxication induced by mistake or fraud but also
that which is a result of the defendants' addiction to alcohol. The court
states:
If Roberts had been intoxicated to the point that he could not dis-
tinguish right and wrong in respect to the shooting of Mrs. Howe
when he shot her, and such intoxication was involuntary because
he suffered from a type of chronic alcoholism which compels in-
voluntary drinking to satisfy a psychological or physiological de-
pendency thereon, Roberts would have a defense. . ..24
The Wisconsin court requires the M'Naughton test to be satisfied before
the accused will be entitled to an acquittal. The M'Naughton rule pro-
vides:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.2
5
An essential element of the rule is that the defendant must suffer from
a "disease of the mind." Apparently the court recognizes alcoholism as
a mental disease. This concept of alcoholism has been promulgated in
recent years by many doctors and social groups, but the precise nature
and manifestations of the disease are still the subject of much debate.
When the new Wisconsin Criminal Code26 becomes effective a defend-
ant will be able to request a determination of sanity based on the ALI
test.2 7 Presumably then an "involuntarily" produced condition of intoxi-
cation which deprived a defendant of his capacity to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law could be grounds for acquittal by reason
of insanity.
CONCLUSION
Intoxication may be a valid defense in Wisconsin. If the defendant's
intoxication is involuntary, that is to say, if it is compelled by a psycho-
2 4 41*Wis. 2d at 545-6, 164 N.W.2d at 529.
25 M'Naughton's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
26 Ch. 255, Laws of 1969.
27 The test for insanity in a criminal case authorized by the American Law In-
stitute is:
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
"(2) As used in this article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include; an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct."
MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962, Article 4, Re-
sponsibility, sec._4.01, p. 66).
1970]
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logical or physiological dependency which renders the actor incapable
of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the act, he may
be entitled to acquittal. Furthermore, where the intoxication is volun-
tary, it may be considered by the trier of fact in determining the exist-
ence of the special intent required for the conviction. In the latter case,
the result may not be acquittal, but a conviction of a lower degree of the
offense where proof of specific intent is not necessary.
In Wisconsin, psychiatrists have always been recognized as expert
witnesses in proving the degree of intoxication of the accused. Roberts,
however, is the first Wisconsin case to allow a psychologist to testify
as to this matter. The court stated,
We think a qualified psychologist ... may testify to his opinion
of the mental condition of the person he has examined. We realize
there is split authority on this point, but we are convinced the
mental state of a person is not exclusively in the realm of medi-
cine.28
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that although the Wisconsin legis-
lature has seen fit to provide a procedure for handling a person dis-
charged by reason of insanity, it has not done so as to a person who
might be discharged because of intoxication. There are no statutory pro-
visions for the handling of such persons after an acquittal. It will be
interesting to note any further development of this defense, especially
in the area of drunken driving.29 However, for all practical purposes,
its scope appears to be limited presently to those exclusive few who are
"chronic alcoholic addictives."
JoHN E. HERALD
2841 Wis. 2d at 551, 164 N.W.2d at 532.
29 See Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401, 164 N.W.2d 314 (1969), (a drunk
driving case decided during the same term as Roberts in which the court
never mentions the defense).
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